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ABSTRACT
Storylines are plausible descriptions of past or future events and can be used to characterize uncertainty
through discrete possible futures. They thereby bridge the gap between global-scale future projections
and local-scale impacts, providing decision-makers with useful information about potential impacts in
multivariate systems despite large swathes of missing data. Here we demonstrate the storyline
approach using the case of household food security in the Caprivi region of Namibia, an example of a
complex system with multiple interacting drivers. We develop a network characterizing influences on
household food security, highlighting drivers that are affected by the local weather (with climate
understood to constitute the collection of possible weather states). The network is used to understand
the storyline leading to household impacts in 2013–14, a consumption year affected by flooding, and
the effects of a range of interventions across wealth groups. Counterfactual storylines are also
developed to characterize potential impacts under different local and national conditions. Through this
we demonstrate how a storyline approach can embed local contextual information to provide
decision-makers with comprehensible and assessable information about possible futures and
interventions. We highlight the importance of identifying common drivers, in this case the local
weather, in producing plausible impact storylines.
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Top-down climate risk assessments often lead to a ‘cascade of
uncertainty’, where the uncertainty range expands at each step,
from the emission scenario to the climate model, regional scen-
ario, impact model, local impacts and adaptation responses
(Wilby & Dessai, 2010). These compounding uncertainties can
potentially render the local-level information un-actionable as
the benefits of action are swamped by the uncertainties. The logi-
calflaw in such an approach is that it ignores the structural, or cor-
related nature of the uncertainty (Shepherd, 2019). Storylines
provide an alternative to this conventional probabilistic approach,
characterizing uncertainty instead through a set of distinct poss-
ible pathways. Storylines are physically self-consistent descrip-
tions of past events or plausible future events (Shepherd et al.,
2018) that are supported by quantitative analysis. They provide
a way of bridging the global prediction scale and the local impact
scale through understanding the driving factors involved in an
event, particularly when dealing with complex, multivariate pro-
blemswhere there is poor data availability (Shepherd et al., 2018).
An example of such a complex problem is that of under-
standing the impact of climate on local food security in rural
communities in Africa. Food security is defined as when ‘all
people, at all times, have physical and economic access to
sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs
and food preferences for an active and healthy life’ (FAO,
1996), and involves farmers, traders, governments and donors,
among other actors. Food security is thus a complex system
with multiple interacting drivers, both environmental and
socioeconomic (Vogel & Smith, 2002), which are uncertain
both in themselves and in how they interact (Ingram, 2011).
These drive insecurity over different timescales, with chronic
stressors such as poverty, conflict and poor market access com-
pounded by short term shocks such as food price increases or
reductions in regional cereal availability (Misselhorn, 2005).
This can make analyzing the impacts of a particular driver
such as climate challenging, as it is interconnected with other
environmental and socioeconomic drivers (Connolly-Boutin
& Smit, 2016). Climate change is likely to affect not only
food availability directly through reductions in yields across
much of Africa (Lobell et al., 2008; Parry et al., 2005), but
also food access due to reductions in household income,
increasing population, increasing food prices and impacts on
supply chains, and food utilization through impacts on drink-
ing water access and health (Brown et al., 2009; Brown & Funk,
2008; Gregory et al., 2005; Lobell et al., 2008; Parry et al., 2005;
Schmidhuber & Tubiello, 2007; Wheeler & von Braun, 2013).
Top-down approaches to model climate change impacts often
lack local contextual information (Wheeler & von Braun,
2013), and data to predict food security, such as market prices,
are often not available at the high spatial and temporal resol-
utions required (Lentz et al., 2019).
In this paper we will develop and discuss food security story-
lines for the Caprivi region of Namibia, to demonstrate how the
storyline approach can provide information on local impacts
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even in the presence of large uncertainty. To ensure the story-
lines are grounded in the local context, they are developed with
data generated using the Household Economy Approach
(HEA, Seaman et al., 2014). The HEA draws on entitlement
theory from Sen (1981) to understand the food security system
at the household livelihood level. Sen defines entitlement as ‘the
set of alternative commodity bundles that a person can com-
mand in a society using the totality of rights and opportunities
that he or she faces’ (1984, p. 497). The HEA models a house-
hold’s ability to get food and other goods within the framework
of rights and opportunities, expressing Sen’s theory in a practi-
cal way for rural households. This does not depend just on the
availability of the goods. Instead, whether a household can
access enough food is modelled from a household’s own food
production, their cash income, assets and the market prices.
In this way a logically complete picture of a household’s econ-
omy is produced from which impacts of shocks can be assessed.
Shocks might include a specific crop being affected by poor
weather conditions or pests leading to reduced yield, or the
price of a commodity increasing on the local market. The meth-
odology is based on focus group interviews to provide enough
information to model the impacts of shocks across households,
while ensuring data collection costs remain reasonable.
The HEA is typically used in policy contexts to generate
storylines using different values of uncertain variables, such
as future crop production or food price. The storylines show
the impacts on household food access and can be used to simu-
late the cost potential interventions such as food and cash dis-
tribution, market support, or tax reductions. The HEA is used
operationally in countries across southern Africa, with results
providing information for governments to address the impacts
of year-to-year shocks, as well as develop scenarios of long term
climate impacts on livelihoods (Luxon & Pius, 2012; Seaman
et al., 2014). This is therefore a context where the use of story-
lines to characterize possible futures is already widely used by
policymakers to initiate and guide interventions (e.g. FEWS
NET, 2020; Government of Malawi, 2005, 2016; Holzmann
et al., 2008; Seaman et al., 2014), with governments and donors
finding the information comprehensible and assessable.
Here, we work from the household economy dataset for
Caprivi, Namibia, to show how HEA-based storylines can be
developed to consider climate risk, where we understand cli-
mate to be the collection of possible weather states. We use a
storyline of a historical event along with counterfactual story-
lines, which might have occurred given different circumstances,
to understand how the multiple drivers of food insecurity inter-
act. We identify key drivers of potential local impacts, and show
how different actions would mitigate those impacts. This
example is used to demonstrate both the process of developing
storylines, and the useful insights that can be gained from
applying a storyline approach, for the wider climate and devel-
opment community, as well as policy implementers.
2. Approach
2.1. Storyline approach
Storylines can be used to understand the most important driv-
ing factors of an impact to improve risk awareness, combine
climate change with other relevant factors to strengthen
decision-making, partition uncertainty, and explore the bound-
aries of plausibility (Shepherd et al., 2018). In particular, epis-
temic uncertainty, which is deterministic in nature, can be
represented using a discrete set of storylines (Shepherd,
2019). Epistemic uncertainties are due to a lack of knowledge,
and may be reduced with increased understanding, for example
by including additional processes in a model representing a sys-
tem (Beven, 2016; Beven & Young, 2013). On the other hand,
aleatoric uncertainties arise from random variability, for
example random measurement errors, and can be represented
by probabilities (Beven, 2016; Beven & Young, 2013).
The key to reconciling storyline and probabilistic
approaches to uncertainty is causal networks, as both can be
considered within this one framework (Shepherd, 2019). Causal
networks are directed acyclic graphs (Pearl, 2009) depicting the
causal influences between elements in a network. They are
developed using data or expert knowledge, with storylines gen-
erated as pathways through the network. Causal networks are
used in many fields to understand the drivers of different
impacts, including specifically as Bayesian networks (e.g. Flores
et al., 2011; Marcot et al., 2006; Pollino et al., 2007; Villordon
et al., 2010). A Bayesian network represents a set of variables
and their conditional dependencies through probability distri-
butions for each variable, conditional on the states of the
other variables.
Storylines can look similar to the outputs of scenario plan-
ning, which has been used across many disciplines for a num-
ber of years, including within adaptation planning for climate
risks (e.g. Chaudhury et al., 2013; Dessai et al., 2005). Storylines
have also been used to represent possible future climate risks;
for example, Ranger and Niehörster (2012) generated scenarios
of wind-related property losses in Florida from possible future
changes in hurricane hazard. Workshops in African cities have
generated climate risk narratives of past and future events, from
the climate context through to impacts and possible responses
in each location (Cornforth et al., 2019; Cornforth & Myers,
2020; McClure, 2018; Scott et al., 2018).
The approach taken here is therefore part of a wider move-
ment using networks and storylines to articulate plausible
futures based on explanations, or causal accounts, of past
events, and thereby to identify actions associated with future
adaptation pathways (Lloyd & Shepherd, 2020). We are not
taking a Bayesian network approach here because, as is the
case for many other ‘real-world’ complex systems, we do not
have sufficient quantitative data to interrogate links between
drivers of food security, identify which are causal, and calibrate
a model. Typically, data is unavailable over long time periods
for some drivers, and other drivers are not easily quantifiable.
Instead, we use the development of a network and knowledge
of the food security context as a framework for a deductive
approach to understand the data we do have available (Laurit-
zen & Spiegelhalter, 1988), and a tool to investigate possible
pathways and impacts.
2.2. Case study: Caprivi, Namibia
To demonstrate the storyline approach we use the example of
food security in Namibia. Namibia was chosen because, as an
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upper middle-income country (World Bank, 2019), it has a
more structured economy and response to national food inse-
curity compared with many other sub-Saharan African
countries. Data was collected in Namibia using the HEA meth-
odology (Seaman et al., 2014) in 2008–2009 to characterize the
economy of a set of ‘typical’ households for the area.
The Namibia Vulnerability Assessment Committee (VAC)
first divided the country into livelihood zones (zones where
households obtain their food and cash income by broadly the
same means) in 2008, using a combination of expert knowl-
edge, literature, and physical, economic and human maps
(Office of the Prime Minister, 2008). Here we focus on the
Caprivi Lowland Maize and Cattle livelihood zone, situated
in the northeast of the country (Figure 1), and vulnerable to
river floods (Office of the Prime Minister, 2010a).
Focus group interviews across villages in each livelihood
zone in 2009 classified wealth groups in each village, based
on productive assets such as land, livestock and labour sources.
Interviews also gathered information on the seasonality of
crops, market access and coping strategies. In Caprivi, focus
groups were held in eight villages, with four wealth groups
identified. It was estimated that 31% of households fall into
the ‘Very Poor’ category, 39% are ‘Poor’, 22% are ‘Middle’
and 8% are ‘Better-off’. A further 26 focus groups were then
carried out with members of each wealth group in each village,
to capture detailed information about household food and
income sources and expenditure patterns. Focus groups were
semi-structured interviews, structured around a classification
of food and cash income sources, with data checked after
each interview for consistency both internally (e.g. amount of
land worked is consistent with the crops produced) and with
the observed standard of living and physiological food require-
ment. Further detail on how data is collected using the HEA
can be found in Seaman et al. (2014, Supplementary material).
In Caprivi, data collection focussed on recall of the agricultural
year 2007–08, which was a relatively normal year in the region
(Office of the Prime Minister, 2010b). Data were combined to
produce a food budget for a year for a typical household in
each wealth group, based on food grown, sold and bought,
and other income sources and expenditures.
Fromthese budgets, theHEAcanbeused tomodelwhatwould
happen in years when there are shocks, and whether a household
in each wealth group would be able to access enough calories
through what they produce and can purchase. For this analysis,
a required minimum calorie intake of 2100 kcal/person/day is
assumed, as derived from information given by the WHO
(1985). This is a figure used operationally to measure access to
enough food energy, as a best estimate for populations of develop-
ing countries.However, people can survive on less than2100 kcal/
person/day, and in some settings a lower valuemight be appropri-
ate. Based on the data collected in 2008–2009, the VAC produces
reports each year documenting predicted food security outcomes.
Webase our analysis on the report for consumption year 2013–14
(Namibia VAC, 2013), as it was a year affected by flooding.
2.3. Developing food security storylines for Caprivi
Using the HEA data and VAC reports, we begin by identifying
the drivers associated with household food security, and
mapping the links between them pictorially. We start from
understanding the factors influencing local household food
security and then consider larger-scale drivers of these, in
order to ensure all local factors are included. We use the net-
work diagram to investigate the unfolding of a historical
event, mapping the drivers and impacts onto the network to
provide a storyline about the past within the causal network
framework. We also consider counterfactuals: what might
have happened had the context or decisions made been differ-
ent? In this way, we demonstrate how HEA data can provide a
quantitative basis for identifying plausible storylines and policy
options.
To understand the storyline of a historical event we use
information available on how the drivers of food security
were changed in that year and apply these to the local house-
hold data to model the impacts. We consider this within the
context of the food security network to understand the effects
of both local and remote drivers. To consider counterfactual
storylines, we make assumptions on the states of drivers and
apply these to the local household data. The benefit of this
approach is that we can make assumptions about drivers
where we do not know their future state, and consider a set
of possibilities, or investigate how impacts in a past event
might have changed had a driver been in a different state.
We can specifically investigate counterfactual storylines invol-
ving potential interventions, allowing us to draw inferences
about their impacts. Considering these in the context of the net-
work diagram helps us ensure that any assumptions made are
plausible, based on our understanding of how drivers relate
to each other.
3. Results
3.1. Household economies in Caprivi, Namibia
Figure 2 shows the sources of households’ food and cash
income in Caprivi in the baseline year (2007–08), from focus
group data averaged across each of the four identified wealth
groups. Food (not including purchases) is shown as a percen-
tage of 2100 kcal/person/day. Maize is an important food
source for all wealth groups, with sorghum and millet also con-
sumed by all. Cows’ milk consumption increases with wealth
while Very Poor and Poor households have a higher depen-
dence on payment in food for farm labour. Households in all
wealth groups also purchase food with their cash income, and
both Very Poor and Poor households require purchased food
if they are to reach 2100 kcal/person/day. Better-off households
typically earn cash incomes of more than three times that of
Very Poor households, with income from sale of cows’ milk,
cattle, maize and fish increasing with wealth. Very Poor and
Poor households are more dependent on pensions and safety
nets, along with farm (weeding, harvesting) and off-farm (con-
struction, domestic, herding) labour income. Households in all
wealth groups also earn some casual income, through the sell-
ing of reeds, poles, thatching grass and alcohol.
Figure 3(a) summarizes the drivers of a household’s econ-
omy in an agricultural year as nodes in a network, taken as
the income and expenditure categories identified through the
focus group interviews: crops, livestock, fishing, labour, other
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income, and expenditure on staple food, other food and liveli-
hood protection. Livelihood protection expenditure includes
costs to maintain the standard of living, such as medical,
schooling, clothing, livestock (drugs, water and restocking),
and crop (seeds and fertilizer) costs.
These drivers are not all independent. One factor affecting
multiple drivers is the local weather (here taken as the weather
across the Caprivi region). Using understanding from the focus
groups we can map out how this can affect multiple elements of
a household’s economy (Figure 3(b)). The local weather
directly affects a household’s crop production and livestock,
impacting what they can consume and sell, but also affects
the availability of local farm labour across Caprivi, such as har-
vesting work.
The main staple foods sold on markets in Caprivi are locally
grown maize and imported food items (Office of the Prime
Minister, 2010a). The staple food price is in part affected by
the local weather conditions, as market prices will increase if
local cereal availability is lower due to poor production and
more has to be transported from elsewhere in Namibia. How-
ever, in Namibia, a large proportion of cereals consumed are
imported (around 50% in a normal year, Office of the Prime
Minister, 2010a) so prices are also driven by the international
market.
Figure 1. Namibia Livelihood Zones. Caprivi Lowland Maize and Cattle Zone is shown in dark green. Based on a figure from the Office of the Prime Minister (2010a).
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Other income sources such as off-farm labour and pensions
are not directly affected by the weather, and while there may
be some effect on availability of fish for consumption and sale
this is not considered here. To maintain their calorie con-
sumption level, if possible a household will react to shocks
in the system. For example, if a household’s crop production
is reduced, they will need to purchase more food, and so
may need to increase cash income in other areas such as
off-farm labour.
3.2. Storyline of 2013–14 consumption year
We use the study of a historical event (2013–14 consumption
year) to demonstrate the process of producing a storyline in
the context of the local food security network and evaluating
the impacts of possible interventions. Table 1 shows the
changes in production leading up to the 2013–14 consumption
year and predicted changes in prices (as of May 2013), relative
to the baseline data (2007–8), from the Namibia VAC (2013).
The 2012–13 growing season leading up to this was character-
ized by prolonged dry spells and erratic rainfall across much of
Namibia (Namibia VAC, 2013), and in the Caprivi region
many crops were destroyed by floods associated with high
water levels in the Zambezi river (IFRC, 2013).
Production in Caprivi was poor across all the major crops
and there were predicted reductions in selling prices for
maize and cows’ milk and the availability of income from har-
vesting labour, self-employment and petty trade (Table 1).
Because we have data on these observed impacts on food pro-
duction, prices and labour, we do not need to know the detailed
weather conditions leading to these or how to model the links
from the weather for the storyline. The low maize selling price,
despite low production, may have been due to low purchasing
power, or drivers external to the Caprivi region, as food avail-
ability also depends on releases from strategic reserves and
imports from South Africa. Staple food purchase price was
expected to be 35% higher than in a normal year. There were
however estimated increases in pensions and cattle sale prices.
Availability of local off-farm labour (primarily construction
labour) was predicted to increase in response to the poor pro-
duction to provide income and boost purchasing power for
maize.
Figure 4(a) depicts the changes in nodes in the household
economy network in 2013–14 that have links to the local
weather. We focus here on the weather-related links over the
previous growing season, and regard other impact-relevant fac-
tors as contingent. While crop production could also have been
affected by pests or access to seed and fertilizer, we assume the
Figure 2. 2007–08 baseline food and income sources for households in the Caprivi region of Namibia for the four wealth groups. Food sources (not including purchases)
are shown as a percentage of 2100 kcal/person/day; income is in Namibian Dollars.
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poor weather had the greatest influence. On the other hand,
livestock stocks were reduced by disease and recurrent drought
(Namibia VAC, 2013), so we assume the weather immediately
preceding 2013–14 had a much smaller influence, and remove
the direct link. While we have made these assumptions for sim-
plicity, other assumptions may also be valid and could be used
to produce alternative storylines to understand food security
impacts under different conditions.
In the HEA household budget calculation, we change
incomes and expenditures from the baseline values of 2007–8
by the percentages observed in 2013–14 conditions (Table 1).
Calories are totalled for each food type consumed, and any
cash income is converted into staple food (maize) calories via
the staple food price. We then examine incomes as calories
per person per day across the wealth groups, as shown in Figure
4(b). We have assumed no increase in off-farm labour avail-
ability but assess the impacts of this later.
Two thresholds are shown in Figure 4(b), which are used to
analyze a household’s vulnerability when data from HEA
studies is applied in policy contexts: a survival threshold and
a livelihood resilience threshold, defined for each wealth
group. A household reaches its survival threshold when it can
meet a minimum calorie intake (taken as 2100 kcal/person/
day, as discussed in section 2.2) and purchase some vital
non-food items (matches, salt, candles, firewood, and water
for human consumption). A household reaches its livelihood
resilience threshold when it can additionally afford its liveli-
hood protection expenditure (described in section 3.1). While
these thresholds do not exist in real life (for example, a person
will survive on less food if they have to, although this is likely to
have detrimental effects on their health), we use them here to
allow us to compare impacts across the wealth groups. Both
thresholds are shown as their calorie value to facilitate compari-
son, although these include non-food purchases which are con-
verted into a calorie equivalent via the staple food price.
Survival thresholds increase with wealth as non-food essen-
tials such as firewood are divided between the number of people
in the household, which decreases with wealth (7 in Very Poor
and Poor households, 6 in Middle, 5 in Better-off). Livelihood
resilience thresholds increase with wealth as better-off house-
holds need to spend more to maintain their level of livelihood
through, for example, higher livestock restocking, labour,
school and medical costs. We assume a household will make
rational decisions with their food and cash to meet these
Figure 3. Network diagram illustrating the components affecting a household’s economy in the Caprivi region of Namibia. (a) the first level drivers, (b) including the links
from the weather.
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thresholds where possible. All wealth groups except the Better-
off would fall below their livelihood resilience thresholds with
the conditions in 2013–14, and the Very Poor would addition-
ally fall below their survival threshold.
The Namibia VAC (2013) suggested a number of interven-
tions to support households over the 2013–14 consumption
year: cash transfers, food transfers, livelihood support (seeds,
fertilizers and animal drugs distributed or subsidized), income
generating activities (off-farm) and waivers of expenditure on
basic services (education and health costs). Table 1 shows
how we change incomes and expenditures in the budgets to
assess the impacts of these interventions. Doubling the off-
farm income available is shown to be particularly beneficial
to Poor households (Figure 4(b)), whereas Middle and Better-
off households earn very little from construction labour in a
normal year so the increase in their income is smaller. (They
may however take up extra off-farm work if it is available,
which is not taken into account here.) Reducing livelihood
expenditure through support (removing expenditure on seed,
fertilizer and animal drugs) and waivers (removing expenditure
on education and health) has a greater effect on the richer
wealth groups, who typically spend more on these outgoings.
Even including all three of these measures (extra off-farm
work, livelihood support and waivers), the Very Poor, Poor
and Middle wealth groups remain below their livelihood resili-
ence thresholds, and the Very Poor remain below their survival
threshold. For these households to meet these thresholds, this
gap would need to be filled by the cash and food transfers
also suggested. The interventions implemented by the
government in this year were support for purchasing seed
and hiring tractors for ploughing, and a zero rating tax policy
for basic commodities to reduce prices, along with relief food
assistance. Households may also have employed some of their
typical coping strategies, such as increasing fish sales, buying
cheaper foods, or receiving gifts of food or cash (Office of the
Prime Minister, 2010a).
3.3. Counterfactual storylines
Having modelled the impacts in 2013–14 and the suggested
interventions, we can also investigate other counterfactuals:
what would the impacts have been had the conditions been
different, or had different decisions been made? Counterfactual
storylines are based on assumptions about what could happen
in a future pathway of events. Assumptions are made explicitly
and allow us to investigate impacts in cases where data is not
available to know the states of all variables in a system. The
impact of different assumptions can be assessed by looking at
storylines of each case.
In the historical storyline, floods destroyed crops, affecting
both food and farm labour availability. The Caprivi region is
vulnerable to annual flooding from its nearby rivers, along
with irregular rainfall and dry spells (Office of the Prime Min-
ister, 2010a, 2010b, 2011, 2012, 2014). How would household
budgets in 2013–14 have been different if the weather had
been good for farming? With our understanding of the network
and which parts of the budgets are directly affected by the
weather, we look at these impacts: we increase crop production
and farm labour availability to 100% (normal baseline con-
ditions, as shown in Table 1) as these are directly affected by
the local weather, but keep the other network nodes unchanged.
By so doing we maintain the assumption made earlier that the
original crop production decreases were due to the poor
weather, but the livestock decreases were not, and we further
assume that good weather (from the farming perspective)
remains possible within the present climate. We keep the off-
farm labour availability at normal levels, so as not to include
any increase in response to poor food production. Staple food
prices are kept at 135%, under the assumption of a storyline
where this price increase is driven by external factors (an alter-
nate storyline could consider the case where food prices were
brought down with the increased local food production). This
is summarized in the network in Figure 5(a).
Figure 5(b) shows the additional income above that of 2013–
14 if we make these assumptions of good local weather. This
greatly increases households’ ability to access food through
both their own crop consumption and purchases with cash
from crop sales and farm labour. All except the Very Poor
would have enough income to maintain their livelihood levels,
while the Very Poor would have enough to be above their survi-
val threshold. This counterfactual storyline is plausible, and so
represents conditions policymakers could be faced with in the
future. This analysis provides the opportunity to consider the
decisions which would need to be made in that case, which
would likely be options to support the Very Poor households.
Another major driver of reduced incomes in 2013–14 was
the 35% increase in staple food purchase price, driven by an
increased demand for market purchases. National cereal
Table 1. Impacts and estimated prices and labour availability in 2013–2014, and
other conditions to be modelled.









Maize sale price 19%
Cattle sale price 113%
Cow’s milk sale price 60%
Staple food purchase price 135%
Labour: cultivation 100%
Labour: harvesting 37%
Labour: local (Off-farm labour) 100%*
Self-employment 61%
Petty trade (Other income) 61%
Pensions and safety nets 123%
















All crop production 100%





Staple food purchase price 100%
*Given as 200% by the Namibia VAC (2013), however this assumes an increase in
response to the other conditions so is modelled as a separate intervention here.
Note: Percentages of normal prices and crop production in 2013-14 are from the
Namibia VAC (2013).
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production was estimated at 27% lower than normal, and 43%
lower than the previous year (Namibia VAC, 2013). Maize
prices on the South African Futures Exchange (SAFEX) market
were above average throughout the consumption year, and par-
ticularly in the first few months of 2014 ahead of the next har-
vest (FEWS NET, 2014), indicative of higher import prices.
Had the national or international weather conditions, and
therefore crop production, been different, prices for staple cer-
eals in Namibia may have remained at normal levels. We can
model the impacts this would have had on households in
Caprivi, illustrating a storyline where local weather conditions
and crop production were still poor but staple prices were nor-
mal due to good national maize availability (Figure 6(a)). We
keep other nodes the same as in 2013–14, under an assumption
that only factors external to Caprivi affected the prices and local
conditions were unchanged, but use normal off-farm labour
availability so as not to assume any increase in this in response
to local conditions (Table 1).
Figure 6(b) shows that with normal staple food prices, cash
income in terms of calories would increase compared to 2013–
14, as the same amount of cash would purchase more staple
food. However, the thresholds would also increase as the calorie
value of the cash component of these would increase. This
counterfactual storyline could occur in reality if the weather
conditions were poor in Caprivi but good across the rest of
the country, and it also illustrates the impact of a possible policy
intervention. Staple food prices could be reduced to normal
levels if they were subsidized by the government and this analy-
sis shows policymakers what the impact of this would be. On its
own this intervention would not bring Very Poor, Poor or
Middle households to meet their livelihood resilience
thresholds, but this could occur when combined with other
interventions. However, it would help bring Very Poor house-
holds much closer to their survival threshold than the off-farm
labour, livelihood support and waiver interventions rec-
ommended previously. Comparing the two counterfactual
Figure 4. 2013–14 storylines. (a) impacts in 2013–14 shown on the network diagram, showing drivers at normal levels, changed from normal, and where changes are
causally linked to the 2012–13 weather conditions. Where changes are not causally linked, the contingent factors are regarded as more important than the 2012–13
weather conditions. (b) resulting incomes and survival and livelihood resilience thresholds for the different wealth groups in 2013–14, along with effects of suggested
interventions. Incomes are shown per person per day divided into calories from income directly as food (own crop and livestock production, gifts as food, payment in
food) and cash income converted into its calorie value.
Figure 5. Good weather counterfactual storyline. (a) network diagram as in Figure 4(a) but for the counterfactual storyline of good weather, (b) incomes and survival and
livelihood resilience thresholds as in Figure 4(b) but with the effect of local crop production and farm labour being at 100%.
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storylines, it is evident that the poor weather conditions were a
much larger factor than the high staple food prices in explain-
ing the challenging conditions for households during the 2013–
14 consumption year, depicted in Figure 4(b). This motivates a
more detailed examination of the vulnerability of the different
wealth groups to weather-related drivers, which is done in the
next section.
3.4. Thresholds
The impacts on households in 2013–14 (Figure 4(b)) were due to
a combination of production and price changes. Understanding
how drivers are linked together in the network (Figure 3(b))
allows us to see which nodes are likely to change simultaneously
due to common drivers, and therefore what storylines of house-
hold impact are plausible. For example, a poor weather year
would not reduce local crop production without also reducing
on-farm labour opportunities. To illustrate the links between
nodes with local weather as a common driver, we investigate
how simultaneous changes in these nodes have different effects
on households. We analyze how large the changes from baseline
‘normal’ conditions (2007–8) in each node or combination of
nodes would need to be to lead to households falling below
their livelihood resilience and survival thresholds, as shown in
Figure 7. We first looked at each node that is influenced by the
local weather individually (Own crops consumed, Income
from crop sales, Own livestock products consumed, Income
from livestock and livestock product sales, Farm labour). We
then looked at the pairs with common drivers (Household
crop production affects both Own crops consumed and Income
from crop sales; Household Livestock affects both Own livestock
products consumed and Income from livestock and product
sales), and finally, at all five nodes together. All components of
a category were reduced at the same rate, e.g. crop production
was reduced by the same percentage for each crop. This is not
an exact representation of how crop production is likely to be
affected by the weather, as some crops will be more resilient
than others, but is used as a demonstration here.
Taking the example of the Poor wealth group, because these
households have relatively little dependence on crops sold,
Figure 6. Normal staple food price counterfactual storyline. (a) network diagram as in Figure 4(a) but for the counterfactual storyline of normal staple food prices, (b)
incomes and survival and livelihood resilience thresholds as in Figure 4(b) but with the effect of staple food prices being at 100%.
Figure 7. Percentages of baseline conditions which bring the different wealth groups down to their survival and livelihood resilience thresholds, for the nodes associated
with the weather conditions. For each wealth group, the top line corresponds to individual nodes, with each node reduced separately; the middle line corresponds to
combined effects of crops consumed and sold, and livestock products consumed and sold; and the bottom line corresponds to all weather-related nodes combined.
Where nodes are grouped together, all change at the same percentage rate. The colour shading is indicative of the vulnerability level, with warmer colours corresponding
to higher vulnerability since only a smaller reduction from the baseline conditions is needed to fall below the threshold.
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livestock products consumed, livestock products sold, and
farm labour, individually, those factors could each fall to
zero (be removed from the budget) without the households
falling below their livelihood resilience threshold (Figure 7).
However, a fall in crops consumed to 35% of normal would
mean falling below this threshold. Considering pairs of
nodes, these households would fall below their livelihood resi-
lience threshold if crops consumed and sold were both
reduced to 44% of normal. Livestock products consumed
and sold could be removed from the income together and
households would remain above the threshold. When all five
nodes are reduced simultaneously, they only need to decrease
to 68% of normal levels for Poor households to fall below their
livelihood resilience threshold. These decreases in individual
and combinations of nodes leading to Poor households falling
to their livelihood resilience threshold are shown in Figure 8,
and illustrate the vulnerability of these households to weather-
related shocks.
As expected, the better-off a household is, the larger the
individual decreases in crops, livestock and farm labour they
can withstand without falling below their livelihood resilience
thresholds, as they are less dependent on these among other
income sources. Indeed, Better-off households could lose
each income source individually without falling below their
livelihood resilience threshold. Other wealth groups require
income from crop production, but can tolerate some
reductions. However, reducing a household’s crop consump-
tion makes the household more dependent on market
purchases, and exposes it to increased market prices if these
occur.
Greater income reductions are required for households to
fall below their survival thresholds. The Very Poor fall below
their survival threshold if there are decreases in crops available
for consumption to 31% of normal, or if all weather-related
income sources fall to 60% of normal. Poor, Middle and Bet-
ter-off wealth groups only fall below their survival thresholds
if there are decreases across all the local weather-related
nodes to 22%, 21% and 19% respectively.
4. Discussion
4.1. Food security impacts in Caprivi, Namibia
We have demonstrated the use of a storyline approach to
understand local food security impacts from different drivers,
using the case of the Caprivi region in Namibia. The impacts
of shocks, such as a poor agricultural production year, differ
depending on wealth group. Correspondingly, interventions
have different effects. In 2013–14, poor crop production had
large impacts for poorer households, while low sale prices
had large impacts for richer households. This led to the Very
Poor, Poor and Middle wealth groups falling below their liveli-
hood resilience thresholds. Increasing off-farm labour avail-
ability had the biggest impact on Poor households, as this
provides a greater proportion of their income. Reducing liveli-
hood costs had a greater impact on the wealthier households,
Figure 8. Poor household incomes from food and cash sources relative to the livelihood resilience threshold, for baseline conditions and changes in weather-related
nodes reducing income to the livelihood resilience threshold as in Figure 7.
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who typically have higher costs to maintain their livelihood
standards. Very Poor households would have remained depen-
dent on food or cash handouts even with the other interven-
tions suggested. However, alternative actions such as
subsidizing staple food purchase price would have been ben-
eficial for this wealth group, as they typically purchase a large
proportion of their food.
While the poorest will mostly (but not always, e.g. De Waal,
1989) be the most severely affected by shocks in a food security
system, the impacts will vary between populations with differ-
ent economies. Using the HEA methodology together with
storylines of potential shocks, the interventions required to
avoid the worst outcomes, specific to each population, can be
determined.
This analysis also highlights the correlated impacts weather
conditions have on household food security. Simultaneous
decreases in crop production, livestock and farm labour lead
to large impacts on a household’s economy, from the Very
Poor households who typically live very close to their liveli-
hood resilience threshold, to the wealthier. Other changes,
such as increased selling prices for crops and livestock, can
partly compensate for these impacts if the buying prices do
not also increase. Weather conditions will also have larger
scale effects at national and international levels, affecting
food availability and price (especially with the large pro-
portions of cereals typically imported into Namibia) and
labour availability nationally. These will propagate down to
the local household level and have differing impacts across
the wealth groups.
4.2. Storylines of future food security
Here, we have demonstrated the use of a network to better
understand the impacts that occurred in the past and the
effects of interventions. This same framework, however, can
also be used to look at storylines of the future. These storylines
could be different weather scenarios within a future climate.
Mapping these through the nodes in the network to produce
plausible food security storylines could use models where rel-
evant, along with expert knowledge. For example, crop models
can estimate crop production under particular weather con-
ditions. The pathways can be associated with plausible policy
actions which would mitigate any negative impacts. While
what is plausible as a policy option is somewhat subjective,
this approach does not have to be purely theoretical. Instead,
people with expert understanding of the context and practical
interest can provide information relevant to the decisions.
Indeed, information generated using the HEA was intended
to be used by policy makers with practical knowledge, and is
currently used in this way. Considering future climate risk
storylines is therefore a natural extension to its shorter-term
use, as well as being a useful tool for modellers, crop scientists,
and other researchers.
There are challenges when looking at climate change story-
lines in this context though. There is a mismatch between long-
term climate projections and the short-term estimates of
impact provided by the HEA, and modelling climate impacts
decades ahead based on a recent year’s economy is unlikely
to provide reliable results. However, this may be sufficient to
provide some information for policymakers, conditional on
the current economy. For example, distinct possible future cli-
mate scenarios could be used, such as the three future climates
for East Africa developed by the HyCRISTAL project (Burgin
et al., 2019) which are characterized by different changes in
temperature and rainfall. Crop models could be used to assess
the impacts of the climate scenarios on different crops, and
then the HEA data and household budget calculation used to
assess the impacts on households. These discrete climate story-
lines would provide a way of characterizing the epistemic
uncertainty, particularly at local scales where classical probabil-
istic uncertainty ranges are likely to be large. Policy options
could then be considered, for example encouraging the use of
different crop varieties where production is likely to decrease.
Socio-economic storylines to characterize possible futures in
the economy could also be combined with the set of climate
storylines.
The network we have developed here focuses on a single
agricultural year. However, it is also important to consider
the impacts of recurrent poor years. If a household falls
below their livelihood resilience threshold they may not be
able to maintain their same livelihood standard to the next
year. A household falling below their survival threshold will
have to use coping strategies to survive, such as selling off
assets, and so will have very little left for the next year. In
this way chronic recurrent crises wear down households’ resili-
ence and their food security (Boyd et al., 2013). Storylines for
longer term planning than a single year will need to take
these potential accumulating impacts into account.
The network focusses on the household level and local
weather for this example, but could also be extended to
show linkages to national and international levels. The results
we show of household impacts are conditional on the states of
the nodes chosen, allowing us to make assumptions about lar-
ger-scale drivers. For example, we can condition on particular
staple food prices, rather than modelling the drivers of food
price. This is particularly useful in a case like this where we
do not know all the drivers to predict food prices, but can
produce storylines based on a range of possibilities. In
another example, deterioration in the Namibian economy
would likely affect the provision of pensions, with differing
impacts across the wealth groups. Storylines characterizing
scenarios with differing pension provision could be combined
with other impacts such as changing food prices or crop
production.
4.3. Storylines for decision-making
The uses we have shown for storylines reflect two of those pre-
sented by Shepherd et al. (2018): improving risk awareness and
strengthening decision-making. We can use the network to
characterize past events and to better understand the combi-
nations of drivers that led to particular impacts. This may
improve risk awareness more effectively than a probabilistic
approach, which users can find difficult to assess and under-
stand (Taylor et al., 2015), as risks are more readily perceived
in an event-oriented manner (Shepherd et al., 2018) incorpor-
ating aspects of vulnerability (Dessai & Hulme, 2004).
Decision-making can be strengthened through using this
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framework with policymakers to work backwards from the
food security vulnerabilities of different wealth groups, combin-
ing information about local weather, production, labour and
price conditions with possible interventions to show the
impacts on households.
The approach also showcases how the effects of different
policy options on household food security can be easily
assessed, as it is straightforward to understand how the infor-
mation was produced. All participants involved, including
decision-makers, are able to understand how the storylines
are developed and the uncertainty involved, and are therefore
free to consider their value and disagree with the assumptions
and outcomes if they wish. As more information becomes avail-
able about uncertain variables, more confident storylines can be
developed and the range of the set reduced. We know the policy
options described here are plausible because they are based on
decisions that have been recommended or implemented in the
past by those working in the specific context. This approach
makes it possible to ensure the information produced is contex-
tually relevant through working with local experts to under-
stand the network of drivers of impacts and the types of
policy options that would be relevant.
5. Conclusion
We have used the example of household food security in the
Caprivi region of Namibia to demonstrate the role storylines
can have in understanding local impacts from larger scale dri-
vers and helping policymakers assess intervention options. We
used a storyline of a historical event where floods destroyed
crops to understand the impacts on local households in differ-
ent wealth groups, and assess the impacts interventions would
have had, highlighting the variations due to different sources of
food and cash income. We then made sets of assumptions to
produce counterfactual storylines, showing how the local
impacts would have been different under good weather or nor-
mal food prices.
We have demonstrated the importance of understanding the
network of drivers of impacts, and how drivers are linked by
common parents, in producing plausible storylines for future
planning. In this context, a household may be able to cope
with losing an individual food or income source entirely, but
these sources are not all independent. Decreases in all sources
affected by the weather can lead to households across the
wealth groups having to consider employing coping
mechanisms.
Looking to future projections, this approach provides a dis-
tinct set of plausible storylines instead of propagated uncer-
tainties from the global to local levels (Wilby & Dessai,
2010). This could provide a useful characterization of uncer-
tainty for a range of climate change impacts experienced at
the local scale. This alternative approach does not make pre-
dictions as such, but provides information and a space to con-
sider future possibilities and potential actions associated with
these. It is how the HEA has been applied in many countries
across Africa to plan interventions (e.g. FEWS NET, 2020;
Government of Malawi, 2005, 2016; Holzmann et al., 2008;
Seaman et al., 2014), with storylines allowing decision-makers
to assess local impacts and the effects of policy decisions,
ensuring households are able to cope with changing weather
conditions.
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